

# Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

Maria Silvia Pini  
 Univ. of Padova, Padova, Italy  
 mpini@math.unipd.it

Francesca Rossi  
 Univ. of Padova, Padova, Italy  
 frossi@math.unipd.it

K. Brent Venable  
 Univ. of Padova, Padova, Italy  
 kvenable@math.unipd.it

Toby Walsh  
 NICTA and UNSW, Sydney,  
 Australia  
 toby.walsh@nicta.com.au

## ABSTRACT

The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time.

It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The stable marriage problem (SMP) [12] is a well-known problem of matching the elements of two sets. Given  $n$  men and  $n$  women, where each person expresses a strict ordering over the members of the opposite sex, the problem is to match the men to the women so that there are no two people of opposite sex who would both rather be matched with each other than their current partners. If there are no such people, all the marriages are said to be *stable*. Gale and Shapley [8] proved that it is always possible to solve the SMP and make all marriages stable, and provided a quadratic time algorithm which can be used to find one of two particular but extreme stable marriages, the so-called *male optimal* or *female optimal* solution. The Gale-Shapley algorithm has been used in many real-life applications, such as in systems for matching hospitals to resident doctors [21] and the assignment of primary school students in Singapore to secondary

**Cite as:** Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures, M.S. Pini, F. Rossi, K.B. Venable, T. Walsh, *Proc. of 8th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2009)*, Decker, Sichman, Sierra and Castelfranchi (eds.), May, 10-15, 2009, Budapest, Hungary, pp. XXX-XXX.

Copyright © 2008, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems ([www.ifaamas.org](http://www.ifaamas.org)). All rights reserved.

schools [25]. Variants of the stable marriage problem turn up in many domains. For example, the US Navy has a web-based multi-agent system for assigning sailors to ships [17].

One important issue is whether agents have an incentive to tell the truth or can manipulate the result by mis-reporting their preferences. Unfortunately, Roth [20] has proved that *all* stable marriage procedures can be manipulated. He demonstrated a stable marriage problem with 3 men and 3 women which can be manipulated whatever stable marriage procedure we use. This result is in some sense analogous to the classical Gibbard Satterthwaite [11,24] theorem for voting theory, which states that all voting procedures are manipulable under modest assumptions provided we have 3 or more voters. For voting theory, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [3] proposed that computational complexity might be an escape: whilst manipulation is always possible, there are voting rules where it is NP-hard to find a manipulation.

We might hope that computational complexity might also be a barrier to manipulate stable marriage procedures. Unfortunately, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate [25]. We identify here stable marriage procedures that are NP-hard to manipulate. This can be considered a first step to understanding if computational complexity might be a barrier to manipulations. Many questions remain to be answered. For example, the preferences met in practice may be highly correlated. Men may have similar preferences for many of the women. Are such profiles computationally difficult to manipulate? As a second example, it has been recently recognised (see, for example, [4,19]) that worst-case results may represent an insufficient barrier against manipulation since they may only apply to problems that are rare. Are there stable marriage procedures which are difficult to manipulate on average?

Another drawback of many stable marriage procedures such as the one proposed by Gale-Shapley is their bias towards one of the two genders. The stable matching returned by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is either male optimal (and the best possible for every man) but female pessimal (that is, the worst possible for every woman), or female optimal but male pessimal. It is often desirable to use stable marriage procedures that are gender neutral [18]. Such procedures return a stable matching that is not affected by swapping the men with the women. The goal of this paper is to study both the complexity of manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures, and to design gender neutral

procedures that are difficult to manipulate.

It is known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate [25]. Our first contribution is to prove that if the male and female preferences have a certain form, it is computationally easy to manipulate *any* stable marriage procedure. We provide a universal polynomial time manipulation scheme that, under certain conditions on the preferences, guarantees that the manipulator marries his optimal stable partner irrespective of the stable marriage procedure used. On the other hand, our second contribution is to prove that, when the preferences of the men and women are unrestricted, there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate.

Our third contribution is to show that any stable marriage procedure can be made gender neutral by means of a simple pre-processing step which may swap the men with the women. This swap can, for instance, be decided by a voting rule. However, this may give a gender neutral stable matching procedure which is easy to manipulate.

Our final contribution is a stable matching procedure which is both gender neutral and NP-hard to manipulate. This procedure uses a voting rule that, considering the male and female preferences, helps to choose between stable matchings. In fact, it picks the stable matching that is most preferred by the most popular men and women. We prove that, if the voting rule used is Single Transferable Vote (STV) [1], which is NP-hard to manipulate, then the resulting stable matching procedure is both gender neutral and NP-hard to manipulate. We conjecture that other voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate will give rise to stable matching procedures which are also gender neutral and NP-hard to manipulate. Thus, our approach shows how combining voting rules and stable matching procedures can be beneficial in two ways: by using preferences to discriminate among stable matchings and by providing a possible computational shield against manipulation.

## 2. BACKGROUND

The *stable marriage problem* (SMP) is the problem of finding a matching between the elements of two sets. More precisely, given  $n$  men and  $n$  women, where each person strictly orders all members of the opposite gender, we wish to marry the men to the women such that there are no two people of opposite sex who would both rather be married to each other than their current partners. If there are no such people, all the marriages are *stable*.

### 2.1 The Gale-Shapley algorithm

The *Gale-Shapley algorithm* [8] is a well-known algorithm to solve the SMP problem. It involves a number of rounds where each un-engaged man “proposes” to his most-preferred woman to whom he has not yet proposed. Each woman then considers all her suitors and tells the one she most prefers “maybe” and all the rest of them “No”. She is then provisionally “engaged”. In each subsequent round, each un-engaged man proposes to one woman to whom he has not yet proposed (the woman may or may not already be engaged), and the women once again reply with one “maybe” and reject the rest. This may mean that already-engaged women can “trade up”, and already-engaged men can be “jilted”.

This algorithm needs a number of steps that is quadratic in  $n$ , and it guarantees that:

- If the number of men and women coincide, and all participants express a linear order over all the members of the other group, everyone gets married. Once a woman becomes engaged, she is always engaged to someone. So, at the end, there cannot be a man and a woman both un-engaged, as he must have proposed to her at some point (since a man will eventually propose to every woman, if necessary) and, being un-engaged, she would have to have said yes.
- The marriages are stable. Let Alice be a woman and Bob be a man. Suppose they are each married, but not to each other. Upon completion of the algorithm, it is not possible for both Alice and Bob to prefer each other over their current partners. If Bob prefers Alice to his current partner, he must have proposed to Alice before he proposed to his current partner. If Alice accepted his proposal, yet is not married to him at the end, she must have dumped him for someone she likes more, and therefore doesn’t like Bob more than her current partner. If Alice rejected his proposal, she was already with someone she liked more than Bob.

Note that the pairing generated by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is male optimal, i.e., every man is paired with his highest ranked feasible partner, and female-pessimal, i.e., each female is paired with her lowest ranked feasible partner. It would be the reverse, of course, if the roles of male and female participants in the algorithm were interchanged.

Given  $n$  men and  $n$  women, a *profile* is a sequence of  $2n$  strict total orders,  $n$  over the men and  $n$  over the women. In a profile, every woman ranks all the men, and every man ranks all the women.

**EXAMPLE 1.** Assume  $n = 3$ . Let  $W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3\}$  and  $M = \{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$  be respectively the set of women and men. The following sequence of strict total orders defines a profile:

- $m_1 : w_1 > w_2 > w_3$  (i.e., the man  $m_1$  prefers the woman  $w_1$  to  $w_2$  to  $w_3$ ),
- $m_2 : w_2 > w_1 > w_3$ ,
- $m_3 : w_3 > w_2 > w_1$ ,
- $w_1 : m_1 > m_2 > m_3$ ,
- $w_2 : m_3 > m_1 > m_2$ ,
- $w_3 : m_2 > m_1 > m_3$

For this profile, the Gale-Shapley algorithm returns the male optimal solution  $\{(m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2), (m_3, w_3)\}$ . On the other hand, the female optimal solution is  $\{(w_1, m_1), (w_2, m_3), (w_3, m_2)\}$ .

### 2.2 Gender neutrality and non-manipulability

A desirable property of a stable marriage procedure is gender neutrality. A stable marriage procedure is *gender neutral* [18] if and only if when we swap the men with the women, we get the same result. A related property, called *peer indifference* [18], holds if the result is not affected by the order in which the members of the same sex are considered. The Gale-Shapley procedure is peer indifferent but it is not gender neutral. In fact, if we swap men and women

in Example 1, we obtain the female optimal solution rather than the male optimal one.

Another useful property of a stable marriage procedure is its resistance to manipulation. In fact, it would be desirable that lying would not lead to better results for the liar. A stable marriage procedure is *manipulable* if there is a way for one person to mis-report their preferences and obtain a result which is better than the one they would have obtained with their true preferences.

Roth [20] has proven that stable marriage procedures can always be *manipulated*, i.e., that no stable marriage procedures exist which always yields a stable outcome and give agents the incentive to reveal their true preferences. He demonstrated a 3 men, 3 women profile which can be manipulated whatever stable marriage procedure we use. A similar result in a different context is the one by Gibbard and Satterthwaite [11, 24], that proves that all voting procedures [1] are manipulable under some modest assumptions. In this context, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [3] proposed that computational complexity might be an escape: whilst manipulation is always possible, there are rules like Single Transferable Vote (STV) where it is NP-hard to find a manipulation [2]. This resistance to manipulation arises from the difficulty of inverting the voting rule and does not depend on other assumptions like the difficulty of discovering the preferences of the other voters. In this paper, we study whether computational complexity may also be an escape from the manipulability of stable marriage procedures. Our results are only initial steps to a more complete understanding of the computational complexity of manipulating stable matching procedures. As mentioned before, NP-hardness results only address the worst case and may not apply to preferences met in practice.

### 3. MANIPULATING STABLE MARRIAGE PROCEDURES

A *manipulation attempt* by a participant  $p$  is the mis-reporting of  $p$ 's preferences. A manipulation attempt is *unsuccessful* if the resulting marriage for  $p$  is strictly worse than the marriage obtained telling the truth. Otherwise, it is said to be *successful*. A stable marriage procedure is *manipulable* if there is a profile with a successful manipulation attempt from a participant.

The Gale-Shapley procedure, which depending on how it is defined returns either the male optimal or the female optimal solutions, is computationally easy to manipulate [25]. However, besides these two extreme solutions, there may be many other stable matchings. Several procedures have been defined to return some of these other stable matchings [13]. Our first contribution is to show that, under certain conditions on the shape of the male and female preferences, *any* stable marriage procedure is computationally easy to manipulate.

Consider a profile  $p$  and a woman  $w$  in such a profile. Let  $m$  be the male optimal partner for  $w$  in  $p$ , and  $n$  be the female optimal partner for  $w$  in  $p$ . Profile  $p$  is said to be *universally manipulable* by  $w$  if the following conditions hold:

- in the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm,  $w$  receives more than one proposal;
- there exists a woman  $v$  such that  $n$  is the male optimal partner for  $v$  in  $p$ ;

- $v$  prefers  $m$  to  $n$ ;
- $n$ 's preferences are  $\dots > v > w > \dots$ ;
- $m$ 's preferences  $\dots w > v > \dots$

**THEOREM 1.** *Consider any stable marriage procedure and any woman  $w$ . There is a polynomial manipulation scheme that, for any profile which is universally manipulable by  $w$ , produces the female optimal partner for  $w$ . Otherwise, it produces the same partner.*

**PROOF.** Consider the manipulation attempt that moves the male optimal partner  $m$  of  $w$  to the lower end of  $w$ 's preference ordering, obtaining the new profile  $p'$ . Consider now the behaviour of the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm on  $p$  and  $p'$ . Two cases are possible for  $p$ :  $w$  is proposed to only by man  $m$ , or it is proposed to also by some other man  $o$ . In this second case, it must be  $w$  prefers  $m$  to  $o$  since  $m$  is the male optimal partner for  $w$ .

If  $w$  is proposed to by  $m$  and also by some  $o$ , then, when  $w$  compares the two proposals, in  $p$  she will decide for  $m$ , while in  $p'$  she will decide for  $o$ . At this point, in  $p'$ ,  $m$  will have to propose to the next best woman for him, that is,  $v$ , and she will accept because of the assumptions on her preference ordering. This means that  $n$  (who was married to  $v$  in  $p$ ) now in  $p'$  has to propose to his next best choice, that is,  $w$ , who will accept, since  $w$  prefers  $n$  to  $m$ . So, in  $p'$ , the male optimal partner for  $w$ , as well as her female optimal partner, is  $n$ . This means that there is only one stable partner for  $w$  in  $p'$ . Therefore, any stable marriage procedure must return  $n$  as the partner for  $w$ .

Thus, if woman  $w$  wants to manipulate a stable marriage procedure, she can check if the profile is universally manipulable by her. This involves simulating the Gale-Shapley algorithm to see whether she is proposed by  $m$  only or also by some other man. In the former case, she will not do the manipulation. Otherwise, she will move  $m$  to the far right it and she will get her female optimal partner, whatever stable marriage procedure is used. This procedure is polynomial since the Gale-Shapley algorithm takes quadratic time to run.  $\square$

**EXAMPLE 2.** *In a setting with 3 men and 3 women, consider the profile  $\{m_1 : w_1 > w_2 > w_3; m_2 : w_2 > w_1 > w_3; m_3 : w_1 > w_2 > w_3; \} \{w_1 : m_2 > m_1 > m_3; w_2 : m_1 > m_2 > m_3; w_3 : m_1 > m_2 > m_3; \}$  In this profile, the male optimal solution is  $\{(m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2), (m_3, w_3)\}$ . This profile is universally manipulable by  $w_1$ . In fact, woman  $w_1$  can successfully manipulate by moving  $m_1$  after  $m_3$ , and obtaining the marriage  $(m_2, w_1)$ , thus getting her female optimal partner. Notice that this holds no matter what stable marriage procedure is used. This same profile is not universally manipulable by  $w_2$  or  $w_3$ , since they receive just one proposal in the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. In fact, woman  $w_2$  cannot manipulate: trying to move  $m_2$  after  $m_3$  gets a worse result. Also, woman  $w_3$  cannot manipulate since her male optimal partner is her least preferred man.*

Restricting to universally manipulable profiles makes manipulation computationally easy. On the other hand, if we allow all possible profiles, there are stable marriage procedures that are NP-hard to manipulate. The intuition is simple. We construct a stable marriage procedure that is computationally easy to compute but NP-hard to invert.

To manipulate, a man or a woman will essentially need to be able to invert the procedure to choose between the exponential number of possible preference orderings. Hence, the constructed stable marriage procedure will be NP-hard to manipulate. The stable marriage procedure used in this proof is somewhat “artificial”. However, we will later propose a stable marriage procedure which is more natural while remaining NP-hard to manipulate. This procedure selects the stable matching that is most preferred by the most popular men and women. It is an interesting open question to devise other stable marriage procedures which are “natural” and computationally difficult to manipulate.

**THEOREM 2.** *There exist stable marriage procedures for which deciding the existence of a successful manipulation is NP-complete.*

**PROOF.** We construct a stable marriage procedure which chooses between the male and female optimal solution based on whether the profile encodes a NP-complete problem and its polynomial witness. The manipulator’s preferences define the witness. The other people’s preferences define the NP-complete problem. Hence, the manipulator needs to be able to solve a NP-complete problem to be able to manipulate successfully. Deciding if there is a successful manipulation for this stable marriage procedure is clearly in NP since we can compute male and female optimal solutions in polynomial time, and we can check a witness to a NP-complete problem also in polynomial time.

Our stable marriage procedure is defined to work on  $n+3$  men ( $m_1, m_2$  and  $p_1$  to  $p_{n+1}$ ) and  $n+3$  women ( $w_1, w_2$  and  $v_1$  to  $v_{n+1}$ ). It returns the female optimal solution if the preferences of woman  $w_1$  encode a Hamiltonian path in a directed graph encoded by the other women’s preferences, otherwise it returns the male optimal solution. The 3rd to  $n+2$ th preferences of woman  $w_1$  encode a possible Hamiltonian path in a  $n$  node graph. In particular, if the  $2+i$ th man in the preference ordering of woman  $w_1$  for  $i > 0$  is man  $p_j$ , then the path goes from vertex  $i$  to vertex  $j$ . The preferences of the women  $v_i$  for  $i \leq n$  encode the graph in which we find this Hamiltonian path. In particular, if man  $p_j$  for  $j < n+1$  and  $j \neq i$  appears before man  $p_{n+1}$  in the preference list of woman  $w_i$ , then there is a directed edge in the graph from  $i$  to  $j$ . It should be noticed that any graph can be produced using this construction.

Given a graph which is not complete in which we wish to find a Hamiltonian path, we now build a special profile. Woman  $w_1$  will be able to manipulate this profile successfully iff the graph contains a Hamiltonian path. In the profile, woman  $w_1$  most prefers to marry man  $m_1$  and then man  $m_2$ . Consider any pair of vertices  $(i, j)$  not in the graph. Woman  $w_1$  puts man  $p_j$  at position  $2+i$  in her preference order. She puts all other  $p_j$ ’s in any arbitrary order. This construction will guarantee that the preferences of  $w_1$  do not represent a Hamiltonian path. Woman  $w_2$  most prefers to marry man  $m_2$ . Woman  $v_i$  most prefers to marry man  $p_i$ , and has preferences for the other men  $p_j$  according to the edges from vertex  $i$ . Man  $m_1$  most prefers woman  $w_2$ . Man  $m_2$  most prefers woman  $w_1$ . Finally, man  $p_i$  most prefers woman  $v_i$ . All other unspecified preferences can be chosen in any way. By construction, all first choices are different. Hence, the male optimal solution has the men married to their first choice, whilst the female optimal solution has the women married to their first choice.

The male optimal solution has woman  $w_1$  married to man  $m_2$ . The female optimal solution has woman  $w_1$  married to man  $m_1$ . By construction, the preferences of woman  $w_1$  do not represent a Hamiltonian path. Hence our stable matching procedure returns the male optimal solution: woman  $w_1$  married to man  $m_2$ . The only successful manipulation then for woman  $w_1$  is if she can marry her most preferred choice, man  $m_1$ . As all first choices are different, woman  $w_1$  cannot successfully manipulate the male or female optimal solution. Therefore, she must manipulate her preferences so that she spells out a Hamiltonian path in her preference ordering, and our stable marriage procedure therefore returns the female optimal solution. This means she can successful manipulate iff there is a Hamiltonian path. Hence, deciding if there is a successful manipulation is NP-complete.  $\square$

Note that we can modify the proof by introducing  $O(n^2)$  men so that the graph is encoded in the tail of the preferences of woman  $w_2$ . This means that it remains NP-hard to manipulate a stable marriage procedure even if we collude with all but one of the women. It also means that it is NP-hard to manipulate a stable marriage procedure when the problem is imbalanced and there are just 2 women but an arbitrary number of men. Notice that this procedure is not peer indifferent, since it gives special roles to different men and women. However, it is possible to make it peer indifferent, so that it computes the same result if we rename the men and women. For instance, we just take the men’s preferences and compute from them a total ordering of the women (e.g. by running an election with these preferences). Similarly, we take the women’s preferences and compute from them a total ordering of the men. We can then use these orderings to assign indices to men and women. Notice also this procedure is not gender neutral. If we swap men and women, we may get a different result. We can, however, use the simple procedure proposed in the next section to make it gender neutral.

## 4. GENDER NEUTRALITY

As mentioned before, a weakness of many stable marriage procedures like the Gale-Shapley procedure and the procedure presented in the previous section, is that they are not gender neutral. They may greatly favour one sex over the other. We now present a simple and universal technique for taking any stable marriage procedure and making it gender neutral. We will assume that the men and the women are named from 1 to  $n$ . We will also say that the men’s preferences are *isomorphic* to the women’s preferences iff there is a bijection between the men and women that preserves both the men’s and women’s preferences. In this case, it is easy to see that there is only one stable matching.

We can convert any stable marriage procedure into one that is gender neutral by adding a pre-round in which we choose if we swap the men with the women. The idea of using pre-rounds for enforcing certain properties is not new and has been used for example in [5] to make manipulation of voting rules NP-hard. The goal of our pre-round is, instead, to ensure gender-neutrality. More precisely, for each gender we compute its *signature*: a vector of numbers constructed by concatenating together each of the individual preference lists. Among all such vectors, the signature is the lexicographically smallest vector under reordering of the members of the chosen gender and renumbering of the members of the other gender.

**EXAMPLE 3.** Consider the following profile with 3 men and 3 women.  $\{m_1 : w_2 > w_1 > w_3; m_2 : w_3 > w_2 > w_1; m_3 : w_2 > w_1 > w_3\}$   $\{w_1 : m_1 > m_2 > m_3; w_2 : m_3 > m_1 > m_2; w_3 : m_2 > m_1 > m_3\}$ . The signature of the men is 12312312: each group of three digits represents the preference ordering of a man; men  $m_2$  and  $m_3$  and women  $w_1$  and  $w_2$  have been swapped with each other to obtain the lexicographically smallest vector. The signature of the women is instead 123213312.

Note that this vector can be computed in  $O(n^2)$  time. For each man, we put his preference list first, then reorder the women so that this man's preference list reads 1 to  $n$ . Finally, we concatenate the other men's preference lists in lexicographical order. We define the signature as the smallest such vector.

Before applying any stable marriage procedure, we propose to pre-process the profile according to the following rule, that we will call *gn-rule* (for gender neutral): If the male signature is smaller than the female signature, then we swap the men with the women before calling the stable marriage procedure. On the other hand, if the male signature is equal or greater than the female signature, we will not swap the men with the women before calling the stable marriage procedure. In the example above, the male signature is smaller than the female signature, thus men and women must be swapped before using the stable marriage procedure.

**THEOREM 3.** Consider any stable marriage procedure, say  $\mu$ . Given a profile  $p$ , consider the new procedure  $\mu'$  obtained by applying  $\mu$  to  $gn\text{-rule}(p)$ . This new procedure returns a stable marriage and it is gender neutral. Moreover, if  $\mu$  is peer indifferent, then  $\mu'$  is peer indifferent as well.

**PROOF.** To prove gender neutrality, we consider three cases:

- If the male signature is smaller than the female signature, the *gn-rule* swaps the men with the women. Thus we would apply  $\mu$  to swapped genders.

To prove that the new procedure is gender neutral, we must prove that, if we swap the men with the women, the result is the same. If we do this swap, their signatures will be swapped. Thus the male signature will result larger than the female signature, and therefore the *gn-rule* will not swap men and women. Thus procedure  $\mu$  will be applied to swapped genders.

- If the male signature is larger than the female signature, the *gn-rule* leaves the profile as it is. Thus  $\mu$  is applied to profile  $p$ .

If we swap the genders, the male signature will result smaller than the female signature, and therefore the *gn-rule* will perform the swap. Thus procedure  $\mu$  will be applied to the original profile  $p$ .

- If the male and female signatures are identical, the men and women's preferences are isomorphic and there is only one stable matching. Any stable marriage procedure must therefore return this matching, and hence it is gender neutral.

As for peer indifference, if we start from a profile obtained by reordering men or women, the signatures will be the same

and thus the *gn-rule* will perform the same (either swapping or not). Thus the result of applying the whole procedure to the reordered profile will be the same as the one obtained by using the given profile.  $\square$

If we are not concerned about preserving peer indifference, or if we start from a non-peer indifferent matching procedure, we can use a much simpler version of the *gn-rule*, where the signatures are obtained directly from the profile without considering any reordering/renaming of men or women. This simpler approach is still sufficient to guarantee gender neutrality, but might produce a procedure which is not peer indifferent.

## 5. VOTING RULES AND STABLE MARRIAGE PROCEDURES

We will now see how we can exploit results about voting rules to build stable marriage procedures which are both gender neutral and difficult to manipulate.

### 5.1 A score-based matching procedure: gender neutral but easy to manipulate

Given a profile, consider a set of its stable matchings. For simplicity, consider the set containing only the male and female optimal stable matchings. However, there is no reason why we could not consider a larger polynomial size set. For example, we might consider all stable matchings found on a path through the stable marriage lattice [16] between the male and female optimal, or we may simply run twice any procedure computing a set of stable marriages, swapping genders the second time. We can now use the men and women's preferences to rank stable matchings in the considered set. For example, as in [15], we can score a matching as the sum of the men's ranks of their partners and of the women's ranks of their partners.

We then choose between the stable matchings in our given set according to which has the smallest score. Since our set contains only the male and the female optimal matches, we choose between the male and female optimal stable matchings according to which has the lowest score. If the male optimal and the female optimal stable matching have the same score, we use the signature of men and women, as defined in the previous section, to tie-break. It is possible to show that the resulting matching procedure, which returns the male optimal or the female optimal stable matching according to the scoring rule (or, if they have the same score, according to the signature) is gender neutral.

Unfortunately, this procedure is easy to manipulate. For a man, it is sufficient to place his male optimal partner in first place in his preference list, and his female optimal partner in last place. If this manipulation does not give the man his male optimal partner, then there is no manipulation that will. A woman manipulates the result in a symmetric way.

### 5.2 Lexicographical minimal regret

Let us now consider a more complex score-based matching procedure to choose between two (or more) stable matchings which will be computationally difficult to manipulate. The intuition behind the procedure is to choose between stable matchings according to the preferences of the most preferred men or women. In particular, we will pick the stable matching that is most preferred by the most popular men and women. Given a voting rule, we order the men using the

women's preferences and order the women using the men's preferences. We then construct a male score vector for a matching using this ordering of the men (where a more preferred man is before a less preferred one). The  $i$ th element of the male score vector is the integer  $j$  iff the  $i$ th man in this order is married to his  $j$ th most preferred woman. A large male score vector is a measure of dissatisfaction with the matching from the perspective of the more preferred men. A female score vector is computed in an analogous manner.

The overall score for a matching is the lexicographically largest of its male and female score vectors. A large overall score corresponds to dissatisfaction with the matching from the perspective of the more preferred men or women. We then choose the stable matching from our given set which has the lexicographically least overall score. That is, we choose the stable matching which carries less regret for the more preferred men and women.

In the event of a tie, we can use any gender neutral tie-breaking procedure, such as the one based on signatures described above. Let us call this procedure the *lexicographical minimal regret* stable marriage procedure. In particular, when voting rule  $v$  is used to order the men and women we will call it a  $v$ -based lexicographical minimal regret stable marriage procedure. It is easy to see that this procedure is gender neutral. In addition, it is computationally hard to manipulate. Here we consider using STV [1] to order the men and women. However, we conjecture that similar results will hold for stable matching procedures which are derived from other voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate.

In the STV rule each voter provides a total order on candidates and, initially, an individual's vote is allocated to his most preferred candidate. The quota of the election is the minimum number of votes necessary to get elected. If no candidate exceeds the quota, then, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and his votes are equally distributed among the second choices of the voters who had selected him as first choice. This step is repeated until some candidate exceeds the quota. In the following theorem we assume a quota of at least half of the number of voters.

**THEOREM 4.** *It is NP-complete to decide if an agent can manipulate the STV-based lexicographical minimal regret stable marriage procedure.*

**PROOF.** We adapt the reduction used to prove that constructive manipulation of the STV rule by a single voter is NP-hard [2]. In our proof, we need to consider how the STV rule treats ties. For example, ties will occur among all men and all women, since we will build a profile where every man and every woman have different first choice. Thus STV will need to tie break between all the men (and between all the women). We suppose that in any such tie break, the candidate alphabetically last is eliminated. We also suppose that a man  $h$  will try to manipulate the stable marriage procedure by mis-reporting his preferences.

To prove membership in NP, we observe that a manipulation is a polynomial witness. To prove NP-hardness, we give a reduction from 3-COVER. Given a set  $S$  with  $|S| = n$ , subsets and subsets  $S_i$  with  $i \in [1, m]$ ,  $|S_i| = 3$  and  $S_i \subset S$ , we ask if there exists an index set  $I$  with  $|I| = n/3$  and  $\bigcup_{i \in I} S_i = S$ .

We will construct a profile of preferences for the men so that the only possibility is for STV to order first one of only two women,  $w$  or  $y$ . The manipulator  $h$  will try to

vote strategically so that woman  $y$  is ordered first. This will have the consequence that we return the male optimal stable marriage in which the manipulator marries his first choice  $z_1$ . On the other hand, if  $w$  is ordered first, we will return the female optimal stable marriage in which the manipulator is married to his second choice  $z_2$ .

The following sets of women participate in the problem:

- two possible winners of the first STV election,  $w$  and  $y$ ;
- $z_1$  and  $z_2$  who are the first two choices of the manipulator;
- “first losers” in this election,  $a_i$  and  $b_i$  for  $i \in [1, m]$ ;
- “second line” in this election,  $c_i$  and  $d_i$  for  $i \in [1, m]$ ;
- “e-bloc”,  $e_i$  for  $i \in [0, n]$ ;
- “garbage collectors”,  $g_i$  for  $i \in [1, m]$ ;
- “dummy women”,  $z_{i,j,k}$  where  $i \in [1, 19]$  and  $j$  and  $k$  depend on  $i$  as outlined in the description given shortly for the men's preferences (e.g. for  $i = 1$ ,  $j = 1$  and  $k \in [1, 12m - 1]$  but for  $i \in [6, 8]$ ,  $j \in [1, m]$  and  $k \in [1, 6m + 4j - 6]$ ).

Ignoring the manipulator, the men's preferences will be constructed so that  $z_1$ ,  $z_2$  and the dummy women are the first women eliminated by the STV rule, and that  $a_i$  and  $b_i$  are  $2m$  out of the next  $3m$  woman eliminated. In addition, let  $I = \{i : b_i \text{ is eliminated before } a_i\}$ . Then the men's preferences will be constructed so that STV orders woman  $y$  first if and only if  $I$  is a 3-COVER. The manipulator can ensure  $b_i$  is eliminated by the STV rule before  $a_i$  for  $i \in I$  by placing  $a_i$  in the  $i + 1$ th position and  $b_i$  otherwise.

The men's preferences are constructed as follows (where preferences are left unspecified, they can be completed in any order):

- a man  $n$  with preference  $(y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 12m - 1]$  a man with  $(z_{1,1,k}, y, \dots)$ ;
- a man  $p$  with preference  $(w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 12m - 2]$  a man with  $(z_{2,1,k}, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- a man  $q$  with preference  $(e_0, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 10m + 2n/3 - 1]$  a man with  $(z_{3,1,k}, e_0, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, n]$ , a man with preference  $(e_j, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 12m - 3]$  a man with preference  $(z_{4,j,k}, e_j, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ , a man  $r_j$  with preference  $(g_j, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 12m - 1]$  a man with preference  $(z_{5,j,k}, g_j, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ , a man with preference  $(c_j, d_j, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 6m + 4j - 6]$  a man with preference  $(z_{6,j,k}, c_j, d_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and for each of the three  $k$  s.t.  $k \in S_j$ , a man with preference  $(z_{7,j,k}, c_j, e_k, w, y, \dots)$ , and one with preference  $(z_{8,j,k}, c_j, e_k, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ , a man with preference  $(d_j, c_j, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 6m + 4j - 2]$  a man with preference  $(z_{9,j,k}, d_j, c_j, w, y, \dots)$ , one with preference  $(z_{10,j,k}, d_j, e_0, w, y, \dots)$ , and one with  $(z_{11,j,k}, d_j, e_0, w, y, \dots)$ ;

- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ , a man with preference  $(a_j, g_j, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 6m+4j-4]$  a man with preference  $(z_{12,j,k}, a_j, g_j, w, y, \dots)$ , one with preference  $(z_{13,j,k}, a_j, c_j, w, y, \dots)$ , one with preference  $(z_{14,j,k}, a_j, b_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and one with preference  $(z_{15,j,k}, a_j, b_j, w, y, \dots)$ .
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ , a man with preference  $(b_j, g_j, w, y, \dots)$  and  $\forall k \in [1, 6m+4j-4]$  a man with preference  $(z_{16,j,k}, b_j, g_j, w, y, \dots)$ , one with preference  $(z_{17,j,k}, b_j, d_j, w, y, \dots)$ , one with preference  $(z_{18,j,k}, b_j, a_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and one with preference  $(z_{19,j,k}, b_j, a_j, w, y, \dots)$ .

Note that each woman is ranked first by exactly one man. The women's preference will be set up so that the manipulator  $h$  is assured at least that he will marry his second choice,  $z_2$  as this will be his female optimal partner. To manipulate the election, the manipulator needs to put  $z_1$  first in his preferences and to report the rest of his preferences so that the result returned is the male optimal solution. As all woman are ranked first by exactly one man, the male optimal matching marries  $h$  with  $z_1$ .

When we use STV to order the women,  $z_1, z_2$  and  $z_{i,j,k}$  are alphabetically last so are eliminated first by the tie-breaking rule. This leaves the following profile:

- $12m$  men with preference  $(y, \dots)$ ;
- $12m - 1$  men with preference  $(w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $10m + 2n/3$  men with preference  $(e_0, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, n]$ ,  $12m - 2$  men with preference  $(e_j, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ ,  $12m$  men with preference  $(g_j, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ ,  $6m+4j-5$  men with preference  $(c_j, d_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and for each of the three  $k$  such that  $k \in S_j$ , two men with preference  $(c_j, e_k, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ ,  $6m+4j-1$  men with preference  $(d_j, c_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and two men with preference  $(d_j, e_0, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ ,  $6m+4j-3$  men with preference  $(a_j, g_j, w, y, \dots)$ , a man with preference  $(a_j, c_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and two men with preference  $(a_j, b_j, w, y, \dots)$ ;
- $\forall j \in [1, m]$ ,  $6m+4j-3$  men with preference  $(b_j, g_j, w, y, \dots)$  a man with preference  $(b_j, d_j, w, y, \dots)$ , and two men with preference  $(b_j, a_j, w, y, \dots)$ .

At this point, the votes are identical (up to renaming of the men) to the profile constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 in [2]. Using the same argument as there, it follows that the manipulator can ensure that STV orders woman  $y$  first instead of  $w$  if and only if there is a 3-COVER. The manipulation will place  $z_1$  first in  $h$ 's preferences. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in [2], the manipulation puts woman  $a_j$  in  $j+1$ th place and  $b_j$  otherwise where  $j \in J$  and  $J$  is any index set of a 3-COVER.

The women's preferences are as follows:

- the woman  $y$  with preference  $(n, \dots)$ ;
- the woman  $w$  with preference  $(q, \dots)$ ;
- the woman  $z_1$  with preference  $(p, \dots)$ ;
- the woman  $z_2$  with preference  $(h, \dots)$ ;

- the women  $g_i$  with preference  $(r_i, \dots)$ ;
- the other women with any preferences which are first-different, and which ensure STV orders  $r_0$  first and  $r_1$  second overall.

Each man is ranked first by exactly one woman. Hence, the female optimal stable matching is the first choice of the women. The male score vector of the male optimal stable matching is  $(1, 1, \dots, 1)$ . Hence, the overall score vector of the male optimal stable matching equals the female score vector of the male optimal stable matching. This is  $(1, 2, \dots)$  if the manipulation is successful and  $(2, 1, \dots)$  if it is not. Similarly, the overall score vector of the female optimal stable matching equals the male score vector of the female optimal stable matching. This is  $(1, 3, \dots)$ . Hence the lexicographical minimal regret stable marriage procedure will return the male optimal stable matching iff there is a successful manipulation of the STV rule. Note that the profile used in this proof is not universally manipulable. The first choices of the man are all different and each woman therefore only receives one proposal in the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm.  $\square$

We can thus see how the proposed matching procedure is reasonable and appealing. In fact, it allows to discriminate among stable matchings according to the men and women's preferences and it is difficult to manipulate while ensuring gender neutrality.

## 6. RELATED WORK

In [18] fairness of a matching procedure is defined in terms of four axioms, two of which are gender neutrality and peer indifference. Then, the existence of a matching procedures satisfying all or a subset of the axioms is considered in terms of restrictions on preference orderings. Here, instead, we propose a preprocessing step that allows to obtain a gender neutral matching procedure from any matching procedure without imposing any restrictions on the preferences in the input.

A detailed description of results about manipulation of stable marriage procedures can be found in [14]. In particular, several early results [6, 7, 9, 20] indicated the futility of men lying, focusing later work mostly on strategies in which the women lie. Gale and Sotomayor [10] presented the manipulation strategy in which women truncate their preference lists. Roth and Vate [23] discussed strategic issues when the stable matching is chosen at random, proposed a truncation strategy and showed that every stable matching can be achieved as an equilibrium in truncation strategies. We instead do not allow the elimination of men from a woman's preference ordering, but permit reordering of the preference lists.

Teo et al. [25] suggested lying strategies for an individual woman, and proposed an algorithm to find the best partner with the male optimal procedure. We instead focus on the complexity of determining if the procedure can be manipulated to obtain a better result. Moreover, we also provide a universal manipulation scheme that, under certain conditions on the profile, assures that the female optimal partner is returned.

Coalition manipulation is considered in [14]. Huang shows how a coalition of men can get a better result in the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. By contrast, we do not

consider a coalition but just a single manipulator, and do not consider just the Gale-Shapley algorithm.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

We have studied the manipulability and gender neutrality of stable marriage procedures. We first looked at whether, as with voting rules, computationally complexity might be a barrier to manipulation. It was known already that one prominent stable marriage procedure, the Gale-Shapley algorithm, is computationally easy to manipulate. We proved that, under some simple restrictions on agents' preferences, *all* stable marriage procedures are in fact easy to manipulate. Our proof provides an universal manipulation which an agent can use to improve his result. On the other hand, when preferences are unrestricted, we proved that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also showed how to use a voting rule to choose between stable matchings. In particular, we gave a stable marriage procedure which picks the stable matching that is most preferred by the most popular men and women. This procedure inherits the computational complexity of the underlying voting rule. Thus, when the STV voting rule (which is NP-hard to manipulate) is used to compute the most popular men and women, the corresponding stable marriage procedure is NP-hard to manipulate. Another desirable property of stable marriage procedures is gender neutrality. Our procedure of turning a voting rule into a stable marriage procedure is gender neutral.

This study of stable marriage procedures is only an initial step to understanding if computational complexity might be a barrier to manipulation. Many questions remain to be answered. For example, if preferences are correlated, are stable marriage procedures still computationally hard to manipulate? As a second example, are there stable marriage procedures which are difficult to manipulate on average? There are also many interesting and related questions connected with privacy and mechanism design. For instance, how do we design a decentralised stable marriage procedure which is resistant to manipulation and in which the agents do not share their preference lists? As a second example, how can side payments be used in stable marriage procedures to prevent manipulation?

## 8. REFERENCES

- [1] K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. North Holland, Elsevier, 2002
- [2] J. Bartholdi and J. Orlin. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. In *Social Choice and Welfare*, 8(4):341-354, 1991.
- [3] J.J. Bartholdi, C. A. Tovey and M. A. Trick, The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. In *Social Choice and Welfare* 6(3):227-241, 1989.
- [4] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate. In *Proc. AAAI'06*, 2006.
- [5] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. In *Proc. IJCAI'03*: 781-788, 2003.
- [6] G. Demange, D. Gale, and M. Sotomayor. A further note on the stable matching problem. In *Discrete Applied Mathematics*, 16:217-222, 1987.
- [7] L. Dubins and D. Freedman. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. In *American Mathematical Monthly*, 88:485-494, 1981.
- [8] D. Gale, L. S. Shapley. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. In *Amer. Math. Monthly*, 69:9-14, 1962.
- [9] D. Gale and M. Sotomayor. Some remarks on the stable matching problem. *Discrete Applied Mathematics*, 11:223-232, 1985.
- [10] D. Gale and M. Sotomayor. Machiavelli and the stable matching problem. *American Mathematical Monthly*, 92:261-268, 1985.
- [11] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. In *Econometrica*, 41(3):587-601, 1973.
- [12] D. Gusfield and R. W. Irving. The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms. MIT Press, Boston, Mass., 1989.
- [13] D. Gusfield. Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage. In *SIAM J. of Computing*, 16(1), 1987.
- [14] C.-C. Huang. Cheating by men in the Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm. In *ESA '06*, pages 418-431, Springer-Verlag, 2006.
- [15] Robert W. Irving, P. Leather and D. Gusfield, An efficient algorithm for the "optimal" stable marriage, In *JACM* 34(3):532-543, 1987.
- [16] B. Klaus and F. Klijin. Procedurally fair and stable matching. In *Economic Theory*, 27:431-447, 2006.
- [17] J. Liebowitz and J. Simien. Computational efficiencies for multi-agents: a look at a multi-agent system for sailor assignment. In *Electronic government: an International Journal* 2 (4):384-402, 2005.
- [18] F. Masarani and S.S. Gokturk. On the existence of fair matching algorithms. In *Theory and Decision*, 26:305-322, Kluwer, 1989.
- [19] A.D. Procaccia and J.S. Rosenschein. Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections. In *JAIR* 28:157-181, 2007.
- [20] A. E. Roth. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. In *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 7:617-628, 1982.
- [21] A. E. Roth. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. In *Journal of Political Economy* 92:991-1016, 1984.
- [22] A. Roth and M. Sotomayor. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis. *Cambridge University Press*, 1990.
- [23] A. Roth and V. Vate. Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms. In *Economic Theory*, 1(1):31-44, 1991.
- [24] M. A. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare function. In *Economic Theory*, 10(3):187-217, 1975.
- [25] C.-P. Teo, J. Sethuraman and W.-P. Tan. Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications. In *Management Science*, 47(9):1252-1267, 2001.